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ABSTRACT
Determining the best interests of incapacitated patients has been observed to be an opa-
que area of the law, and this is no less so in decisions about the (non-)treatment of pa-
tients in the minimally conscious state. A systematic examination of the way best inter-
ests are used in judgments relating to this population suggests that narratives involving
the character of the patient frequently form an important plank of judicial reasoning.
Since insights into the concept of best interests may be gained by an engagement with
the philosophy of well-being, I identify the court’s character-based approach with perfec-
tionist theories of well-being. These use human nature to furnish an objective list of abil-
ities needed for human ﬂourishing. Guided by the Mental Capacity Act (MCA), this list
becomes focused primarily on autonomy. Incapacitated patients are assumed to have
wishes, but to lack agency. Judges search for these wishes in narratives about the patient
and supply the means to exercise these wishes. This analysis suggests three concerns
about the court’s approach: ﬁrst, by placing so great a weight on autonomy, the law of-
fers an impoverished account of human nature; secondly, adversarial law encourages
partial determinations of character, and this raises concerns about whether the courts
are equipped to explore the complexities of character narratives; and, thirdly, experi-
mental psychology indicates character is not as predictable as an assessment under
MCA requires. While character narratives may unburden decision-makers, this analysis
suggests the limits of autonomy may have been exceeded in this area of the law.
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I . INTRODUCTION
‘There is . . . a very great difference between a man’s reputation and a man’s charac-
ter, for reputation is what men think and say of us, while character is what God and
the angels know of us.’1
Price Collier’s 1892 sermon draws on a familiar distinction between the person known
to others and the unmediated person known only to the Almighty. This distinction
applies not just to theology. It draws on questions familiar to social science2 and psy-
chology3 about how much a person can be known to others, how much is known only
to the self, and how much can never be known. Our answers determine, inter alia, the
limits of our ability to respect autonomy when we make decisions for others.
Using analysis of cases about (non)treatment in minimally conscious state (MCS),
this article explores this issue. In particular I consider the way character (which I
broadly construe as personal qualities, personality, and past and present behaviours)
is used in judgments. While the way character evaluation operates in criminal law has
been explored,4 this article focuses upon civil law. In particular I explore the way that
character is used to inform determinations of best interests. I observe that assessment
of character is being used to play a (sometimes large) evidential role in sketching the
probable motivations of patients in MCS. I suggest that character is used in judgments
to supply a narrative from which to adjudge the patient’s wishes and thereby deter-
mine their best interests. This approach is led by the autonomy-enhancing spirit of
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005), section 4(6). This states that, absent an
advance decision to refuse treatment (ADRT) or lasting power of attorney (LPA),5
decisions made in the best interests of an incapacitated person must give due consid-
eration to the wishes and feelings, beliefs, and values that would inﬂuence the person’s
decision.
My exploration of this state of affairs is two-pronged. I seek to clarify the way char-
acter is used to determine best interests by undertaking a philosophical analysis. Once
this analysis is developed I use these insights to develop a critique of current practice.
We can gain philosophical insight into the best interests standard by drawing on theo-
ries of prudential value, otherwise known as the philosophy of well-being.6 By examin-
ing these theories, I identify connections between best interests judgments and so-
called ‘perfectionist theories of well-being’ (hereafter: perfectionist approaches).7 These
suggest that personal well-being is achieved through the expression of particular as-
pects of human nature.8 By comparing the theoretical processes by which perfectionist
approaches are derived with the practice of the law, I raise three key criticisms about
1 P Collier, Sermons (EP Dutton 1892) 216.
2 JA Holstein and JF Gubrium, The Self We Live By: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World (OUP 2000).
3 J Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behaviour (CUP 2002).
4 Eg J Winter, ‘The Truth Will Out? The Role of Judicial Advocacy and Gender in Verdict Construction’
(2002) 11 S & LS 343.
5 MCA 2005, ss 24–26 and 9–14, respectively.
6 D DeGrazia, ‘Value Theory and the Best Interests Standard’ (1995) 9 Bioethics 50.
7 Perfectionist theories of well-being should not be confused with other theoretical guises of perfectionism, eg
political perfectionism.
8 G Bradford, ‘Perfectionism’ in G Fletcher (ed), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Wellbeing
(Routledge 2016) 124.
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the ways character informs the judgment of best interests in MCS: ﬁrst, by seeking
narratives that privilege autonomy, the law overlooks the diversity of possible
approaches to frailty and dying held by patients. Secondly, adversarial law encourages
partial determinations of character in MCS, raising concerns about the suitability of
the courts to explore the complexities of character. Thirdly, experimental psychology
indicates character is not as predictable as an assessment under MCA 2005 section
4(6) requires, raising questions about the ability of character to inform determinations
of speciﬁc wishes.
My overall intention is to critically inform the development of the best interests
test. An ideal best interests test must take account of the (formally stated) prior
wishes of the patient, the deleterious effects of their disease (including apparent pain
and distress), and the views of those closest to the patient including the expert views
of both family and healthcare professionals (without under- or over-stating the value
of each). Such a process requires evaluations of science and ethics, which are transpar-
ent and open about the limitations of each discipline. Many of these elements are pre-
sent in current case law. However, I argue that while analysis of character provides a
sometimes narratologically satisfying background to decisions, it should not sufﬁce for
an account of prior wishes where these are not present. Nor, in the case of a severe
neurological impairment, should past character be treated as a gloss to current ambig-
uous behaviours.
I I . BACKGROUND
A. Best Interests in MCS
MCS is a type of disorder of consciousness where patients show consistent and repro-
ducible signs of awareness, albeit at a very limited level.9 MCS has been recognised in
medical guidelines since 2002. Decisions about non-treatment of patients in both
MCS and permanent vegetative state (PVS, a related disorder where the patient
shows no consistent signs of awareness) must come before the courts.10 For some
time following Bland,11 where the courts ﬁrst considered non-treatment of PVS pa-
tients, MCS was not distinguished from PVS. Records show a number of cases where
patients showed signs of minimal awareness.12 In these early cases, while medical wit-
nesses were divided over whether PVS could be diagnosed, the courts were minded to
allow withdrawal on the basis set out in Bland.13 Central to this basis was the sugges-
tion in Bland that a patient in PVS has no prospect of recovery. As a result, treatment
of a PVS patient is futile and best interests need no further consideration. Since W v
M,14 the approach to MCS has differed from PVS. W v M established that treatment
of patients in MCS may not be futile. Instead, best interests should be determined on
9 JT Giacino and others, ‘The Minimally Conscious State: Deﬁnition and Diagnostic Criteria’ (2002) 58
Neurology 349.
10 Court of Protection Rules, Practice Direction 9E, para 5. At the time of publication this approach may be
evolving. See: M v A Hospital [2017] EWCOP 19.
11 Airedale v Bland [1993] AC 789.
12 Frenchay v S [1994] 2 All ER 403; Re D [1997] 38 BMLR 1; Re H [1998] 3 FCR 174; A v H [2002] 1 FCR
713.
13 Bland (n 11).
14 [2011] EWHC 2443.
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a case-by-case basis on the aggregate balance of interests. Subsequently, in James,15 fu-
tility was judged by the Supreme Court to rest only on whether the patient would
have thought the treatment was futile, rather than the treatment’s prospect of cure.
Consideration of best interests in MCS may therefore lead to treatment (eg W v M)
or may not (eg Briggs16).
Bland17 also conﬁrmed the possibility of the patient’s advance decision determin-
ing their best interests once incapacitated. Subsequently a 20-year-old verbal request
for non-treatment of a patient in a terminal state of reduced consciousness,18 was con-
sidered too remote and too little informed of the fatal consequences to constitute a
valid ADRT. The approach of the courts is now led by the MCA 2005. This indicates
that the patient’s autonomous wishes guide decision-making when they have the ca-
pacity to decide. Where the patient lacks capacity, decisions will either: follow the pa-
tient’s prior wishes in the form of an advance decision; be guided by the individual(s)
named by the patient in a LPA for health and welfare, or; assess the patient’s best in-
terests by ascertaining wishes and feelings, beliefs, and values and any other informa-
tion that they would consider relevant to the decision. The MCA 2005 placed
rigorous requirements on ADRTs with fatal consequences. These must be in writing,
signed, and witnessed if they are to be applicable.19 Because in common law, best in-
terests is held to encompass a full range of considerations including ‘medical, emo-
tional and all other issues’,20 informal statements about the values, wishes, and beliefs
of patients have a role in determining best interests. However, the courts have consis-
tently distinguished the best interests test from ‘substituted judgment’.21 This is a doc-
trine in US law that allows the judge, informed by the incapacitated patient’s past
remarks and attitudes, to make the decision on behalf of the incapacitated patient that
she considers the patient would prefer if they momentarily regained capacity. The
best interests test is nevertheless held to contain a strong element of substituted judg-
ment.22 The increasing inﬂuence of informal reports of prior wishes in determining
the best interests of patients in MCS,23 has led some commentators to suggest per-
sonal autonomy is on the march.24
B. Best Interests in Philosophy
The best interests test has long been argued to allow subjective value judgments.25
Some commentators argue that this allows decision-makers an excessive discretion.26
15 Aintree v James [2013] UKSC 67.
16 [2016] EWCOP 53. The Briggs decision was delivered during the writing of this article and does not form
part of this analysis, although it appears consistent with it.
17 Bland (n 11).
18 W v KH [2004] EWCA 1324.
19 MCA 2005, s 25(5–6).
20 Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193, 200 (Butler-Sloss P).
21 Bland (n 11);W v M (n 14); James (n 15).
22 Bland, ibid; James, ibid.
23 Eg Briggs (n 16).
24 J Baker, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’ (2017) 43 J Med Ethics 427.
25 Eg E Wicks, ‘When Is Life Not in Our Own Best Interests? The Best Interests Test as an Unsatisfactory
Exception to the Right to Life in the Context of Permanent Vegetative State Cases’ (2013) 13 Med L Int 75.
26 Eg M Donnelly, ‘Determining Best Interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2011) 19 Med L Rev 304.
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Others contend that this lack of prescriptivity allows decision-makers to sensitively re-
spond to unique aspects of cases.27 Some clarity about the types of values, and coher-
ence of approaches, used in the best interests test can be gained by considering
philosophical perspectives. Philosophers identify the best interests test with prudential
value theory, the study of personal well-being.28 Also known as the philosophy of
well-being, this theory contains three overarching accounts.29 Desire accounts suggest
that our lives go best if we are able to satisfy our wants or preferences. What is most
desired by the individual is what is good for that individual, and the thwarting of a de-
sire is equally harmful to that individual’s well-being. The argument that our well-
being is enhanced by the fulﬁlment of our desires has a strong pedigree in western
philosophy. Desire-based accounts are at the centre of economic and political the-
ory.30 In its purest form, a desire account may suggest the well-being of patients in
MCS is judged on the basis of their antecedent wishes, and a patient who expressed a
prior wish for (non-)treatment should be respected. Objections to desire theories in-
clude the concern that fulﬁlment of uninformed, capricious, or ﬂeeting desires seem
unlikely to enhance well-being.
Hedonistic accounts argue that the best lives are those in which pleasure or happi-
ness is maximised, while pain is the source of harm to well-being.31 If both wanted
and unwanted pleasures are taken to be equal, the idea that pleasure is the source of
well-being may be a compelling way of assessing the well-being of patients in MCS
who seem happy despite their disability. Such an account might favour non-treatment
of an MCS patient only if the patient is in pain, or alternatively, suggest non-
treatment where incapacity is so great that no pleasure can be experienced.
Objections to hedonistic theories suffer objections that unpleasant experiences can be
experienced positively (I may be glad to feel exhaustion after a visit to the gym as it
shows it has done me good).
Objective list accounts contend that lives go best according to ﬁxed criteria. These
accounts suggest that a universal list of things that are good for people can be identi-
ﬁed. Our well-being is greater if we have more of the things on this list, and less if we
have fewer.32 There are a great many objective list theories, and content varies, but
objective lists commonly exclude direct appeals to desires or pleasures (we need not
desire or enjoy what is good for us) and include a plurality of goods (there are a num-
ber of things that are good for us).33 Proponents claim that objective list theories are
the theories of well-being most likely to succeed. They claim objective lists are intui-
tively more plausible than other theories. Further, because they can exclude things
which seem obviously harmful to well-being, they allow objective lists to nullify the
27 Eg LM Kopelman, ‘The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of All Ages’
(2007) 35 J Law Med Ethics 187.
28 D Parﬁt, ‘Reasons and Persons’ (OUP 1987); DeGrazia (n 6).
29 V Tiberius, ‘Prudential Value’ in I Hirose and J Olson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (OUP
2015) 158.
30 MD Adler, ‘Value and Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis’ in Hirose and Olson, ibid 317; E Angner, ‘Well-being and
Economics’ in Hirose and Olson, ibid 492.
31 Tiberius (n 29).
32 G Fletcher, ‘Objective List Theories’ in Fletcher (n 8) 148.
33 ibid. There is a debate as to whether objective lists can contain only one item.
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strongest objections to desire and hedonistic theories. One exemplary objective list
theory contains the following items: moral goodness, rational activity, development of
abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge and awareness of
beauty.34 Since the lives of patients in MCS are unlikely to contain many of these
items, their levels of well-being might be judged to be low, and therefore non-
treatment might be justiﬁed, even if the patient has expressed no wish for this and
seems happy. However, critics argue that objective lists tend to lack any satisfying the-
oretical basis for including the items they do, suggesting they are capricious and the
conclusions they guide potentially unfounded.35
Anticipating that one or more of these accounts will, in some form, be present in
judgments of best interests in MCS, we can surmise that an investigation into the the-
oretical basis of these judgments will yield a richer and more informative understand-
ing of the best interests test.36
C. BABEL: Best Interests in Medical Ethics and Law
This article arises from BABEL, a Wellcome Trust funded seed project based on the
research question ‘How are the best interests of incapacitated patients interpreted and
applied in judicial decision-making?’ The project aims to build research communities
that explore how bioethics and law interact in the interpretation and application of
the best interests test. While the ultimate intention is to consider best interests in a
wide frame, the ﬁrst phase of the project has explicitly focused on small areas of judg-
ments, including where the non-treatment of patients in MCS is in question. This
provided an achievable focus for activities in the ﬁrst year, as well as identifying meth-
odologies and concepts for more sustained investigation as the project matures.
The methods by which this research was undertaken are described in detail else-
where37; however, in brief, a search was conducted for all judgments until July 2016
that discussed non-treatment of patients either in a MCS, or experiencing a disorder
of consciousness that appeared (to the author) diagnostically similar to MCS
(ie where patients were judged to be in a vegetative state despite questions being
raised about their diagnosis). The resulting case series comprised seventeen cases.38
The judgments were imported into NVivo 10 software and analysed using a thematic
34 Parﬁt (n 28) 499.
35 Fletcher (n 32).
36 As such, this paper forms part of a wider project (see below) which has so far published two linked articles
on this theme: R Huxtable, ‘From Twilight to Breaking Dawn? Best Interests, Autonomy, and Minimally
Conscious Patients’ (2016) 24 Med L Rev 622; R Huxtable and G Birchley, ‘Seeking Certainty? Judicial
Approaches to the (Non-)Treatment of Minimally Conscious Patients’ (2017) 25 Med L Rev 428. A third
paper looking at the ethical values within MCS judgments is planned.
37 Huxtable and Birchley, ibid.
38 Databases were searched for cases in December 2015 and July 2016. The cases were: Frenchay (n 12); Re D
(n 12); Re H (n 12); A v H (n 12); W v KH (n 18);W v M (n 14); Re JD [2012] EWHC 4420; NHS Trust
v L [2013] EWHC 4313; James (n 15); NHS v VT [2014] COPLR 44; Shefﬁeld v TH [2014] EWCOP 4;
County Durham v PP [2014] EWCOP 9; Lincolnshire v N [2014] EWCOP 16; Gloucestershire v AB [2014]
EWCOP 49; St George’s v P [2015] EWCOP 42; M v N [2015] EWCOP 76; Re S [2016] EWCOP 32.
Since the search further cases have been decided: Briggs (n 16); Abertawe v RY [2017] EWCOP 2; M v A
Hospital [2017] EWCOP 19.
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approach.39 This allowed the close scrutiny of the facts, approaches, and values40 that
occur within this body of case law, and the identiﬁcation of broad themes that could
be comprehensively illustrated using extracts from the judgments.
D. Themes Arising from the Cases
The cases reveal a complex and changing approach to MCS. The themes that inform
these approaches could be framed in a variety of ways. For example, parallel cases starkly
highlight changes of approach:W v KH41 andM v N,42 both concern patients with multi-
ple sclerosis (MS) at the end of their lives whose families believe would not wish to be
treated. Such cases were used to consider the predictability of legal approaches.43 The
cases allowed examination of the type and weight of values that are used in each case.
Here I concentrate on a third theme, the role of character. Detailed studies of pa-
tient character are immediately apparent in the judgments of Hayden J (eg M v N44
and Shefﬁeld v TH45). Examination of other cases revealed this approach occurred in
sixteen of the seventeen cases in our series, and encompassed the character of the fam-
ily or other witnesses as well as the patient.46 While we might expect criminal law to
take an interest in the characterological aspects of witnesses and defendants, this ﬁnd-
ing was somewhat unexpected where the best interests of incapacitated patients were
considered. Since the theme was so abundant, and patient character was the most in-
teresting aspect of the use of character, this article concentrates exclusively on the way
the character of the patient is portrayed. As my discussion will indicate, character is a
contested concept; nevertheless, a broad deﬁnition is sufﬁcient for the purposes of
this article. I take character to encompass the qualities of an individual drawn from
their past and current behaviours. In the cases in the series, these qualities are used to
furnish a narrative of what makes that individual who they are. From the narrative is
abstracted likely motivations and intentions.
The law is no stranger to evaluating character. Criminal law tends to focus on
intention rather than motive, and the mens rea has sometimes been observed to
contain a characterological dimension.47 For example, feminist legal scholars have
39 J Thomas and A Harden, ‘Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic
Reviews’ (2008) 8 BMCMed Res Methodol 45.
40 While the identiﬁcation of facts may be clear to a legal audience, the scrutiny of values and approaches may
require more explanation. Values were identiﬁed either because they were explicit (eg naming autonomy or
the sanctity of life) or implicit (ie a pro-autonomy position might be made out in discussion of dependence)
in each judgment. The analytical technique allowed clusters of similar statements of value to be collected
into themes that could be scrutinised for philosophical clarity and coherence. Approaches were similarly ei-
ther explicit (did the judge draw up a balance sheet or not?) or could be made out implicitly, eg by the de-
gree of inﬂuence family versus professional witnesses appeared to have on the judges reasoning. Examples
of the latter can be found in Huxtable and Birchley (n 36).
41 W v KH (n 18).
42 M v N (n 38).
43 Huxtable and Birchley (n 36).
44 M v N (n 38).
45 Shefﬁeld v TH (n 38).
46 The only case where character did not appear was A v H (n 12).
47 D Nicholson, ‘Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who Kill’
(1995) 3 Fem LS 185; Winter (n 4); EN Yankah, ‘Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character,
Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment’ (2004) 25 Cardozo L Rev 1019.
Character, Autonomy, and Best Interests in Minimally Conscious State • 7
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwx051/4621373
by University of Bristol Library user
on 27 March 2018
analysed the role of gendered assumptions about character in the construction of
verdicts in criminal trials. Nicholson compares two criminal cases where battered
women had killed their abusive partners in similar circumstances.48 He argues the
courts employed biographical factors unrelated to the case to place the women on
a ‘spectrum of femininity’.49 These evaluations place each woman on a continuum
of ﬁckleness or ﬁdelity, submissiveness or assertiveness, caringness or selﬁshness,
and are observed to colour the facts and lead to opposite outcomes. Such charac-
terisation may not be inevitable. A strictly consequentialist account of the law
could conceivably eschew judgments of character and rely only on the evidence of
the harmful outcome (ie causation), on the basis that punishing those responsible
is most effective in controlling crime.50 Yet, arguably, widespread public respect is
essential for a functional system of law. This creates a strong incentive for the law
to be seen to punish wrongdoers according to dessert. Character also plays its part
in civil law. This may occur in the use of paradigmatic example against which
the behaviour of parties is compared, for example, Munby P’s discussion of good
parenting in the child custody case of H-B.51 Judgments of the character of
witnesses may also be made, and considered indicative of the (un)reliability of
their testimony. This is can be seen where similar family behaviours are character-
ised as in dramatically different ways. Thus, the resistance to withholding treatment
by a family in St George’s v P52 is portrayed as steadfast and measured, while the op-
position of a family to withholding treatment in County Durham v PP53 is vacillat-
ing and bellicose. Finally, in the absence of a valid advance decision or LPA, the
Court of Protection may explore the character of the incapacitated patient to assay
their wishes and values in accordance with the MCA 2005, section 4(6). In these
cases, character informs a narrative that ultimately underwrites a best interests
judgment.
I note, prior to our discussion, that I may be accused of taking some terminological
liberties. Some consider ‘personality’ to denote amoral traits like introversion, while
‘character’ denotes moral traits, such as honesty.54 Whether character in this moral
sense can be empirically investigated is debated in psychology.55 Since any distinction
does not affect my arguments, unless making speciﬁc reference to personality psychol-
ogy, I use the term ‘character’ hereafter.56
48 Nicholson ibid.
49 ibid 190.
50 Doris (n 3) 128.
51 Re H-B [2015] EWCA Civ 389, [75–76].
52 St George’s v P (n 38).
53 County Durham v PP (n 38).
54 W McDougall, ‘Of the Words Character and Personality’ (1932) 1 J Pers 3; A nuanced account of such dis-
tinctions is found in: CB Miller, ‘Character and Moral Psychology’ (OUP 2014) 3–37.
55 PL Hill and BW Roberts, ‘Propositions for the Study of Moral Personality Development’ (2010) 19 Curr
Dir Psychol Sci 380.
56 I also note that our discussion collides concepts of character with considerations of self-identity, which
draws in other distinct literatures.
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I I I . PATIENT CHARACTER IN MCS
Not all cases in the series employ patient character in a sophisticated way.57 Its ab-
sence may emphasise other features of the patient, for example, their extreme dis-
ability. I lack the space here for analysis of character or its absence in every case.
To economise, I will discuss four exemplar cases, beginning with W v M.58 These
exemplars were selected both to illustrate the range of ways that character can play
a part in judgments, and demonstrate that it is a commonplace approach to
judgecraft.
A. W v M: Playful and Flirtatious
W v M,59 the ﬁrst case in which MCS is explicitly distinguished by the courts,60 con-
tains two competing portrayals of the patient. Her family characterises M as thwarted
by her disability while M’s carers sketch her rich range of emotional and interpersonal
behaviours.
M had sustained severe brain damage following an acute infection, and spent 7
years presumed to be in PVS. An application was made to the court by the family for
withdrawal of Artiﬁcial Nutrition and Hydration (ANH). Expert investigations under-
taken for the purposes of the application concluded that M was in MCS, rather than
PVS. Her family gave evidence that M’s antecedent behaviour would nevertheless sup-
port withdrawal of treatment. The care home staff offer a different portrait that em-
phasises M’s quality of life, including her response to music and to her carers. The
court accepted that there had been no improvement in M’s condition for some years,
and that the chances of further recovery were remote. Nevertheless Baker J concluded
that M’s level of consciousness prevented withdrawal of ANH. He refused the applica-
tion, ﬁnding that M’s quality of life might be improved with stimulation, and that re-
spect for the sanctity of life should prevail.
At a fundamental level W v M hinges on a contested view of who the patient is,
and therefore, what constituted her character. Is M the independent person who
would have rejected a life of dependence? Or is she a disabled person whose life re-
tains meaning and pleasure, given the right stimuli?61 This is far more than a test of
prior versus present wishes, but an investigation into identity. Great efforts are made
to portray M’s character in particular ways.62
M’s family describes M as active, strong willed, and caring, attributes she manifestly
does not have the ability to express in her current state. For example, her partner said
M was a:
57 For example, patient character is absent in Re H (n 12) and A v H (n 12) and is mentioned only in passing
in andW v KH (n 18), Re JD (n 38), County Durham v PP (n 38) and Gloucestershire v AB (n 38).
58 W v M (n 14).
59 ibid.
60 MCS was diagnosed in A v H (n 12), but the court did not distinguish this from PVS.
61 Detailed discussion of whether the person who has lost capacity is different from that person prior to their
loss of capacity would be digressive. See: T Hayes, ‘A (social) Room with a View (to the Future): Advance
Decisions and the Problem of Personhood’ in R Huxtable and R ter Meulen (eds), The Voices and Rooms of
European Bioethics (Routledge 2015) 87–102.
62 It is germane to note that M’s prior wishes are weighed very lightly, while characters of family members are
called into question (however sympathetically). EgW v M (n 14) [129, 166, 167].
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strong-willed person who was not one to shy away from things she believed in
. . . she was someone who was pretty focused on what she wanted out of life -
someone who knew her own mind.63
For her sister, M’s MCS was a fundamental impediment to M’s self-expression: ‘She
can’t enjoy things like she used to do, how can being taken out change her
condition?’64
The testimony of M’s family offers some broad brush sketches of M’s formerly in-
dependent character, and the severity of her disability. The characterisation of M by
her professional carers contrasts with this evidence. In a quantity (ﬁfty paragraphs ver-
sus sixteen) and richness that overshadows the evidence of the family, the carers paint
a contrasting portrait. While disabled, M is able to communicate with noises and facial
expressions (and, according to two witnesses, by speaking). She ‘makes sounds which
I think is her way of telling us she wants us to do something, whether she is content
or upset’,65 and responds to complex questions. She is childlike66 and innocent. Much
is read into what M looks at; several staff suggest her looks express affection for partic-
ular individuals.67 These reports are given more colour by suggesting they indicate
M’s interest in men, about which M is gently teased;
Care Worker W gave evidence of how M behaved in what she described as a
“ﬂirtatious” manner when Mr. Badwan visited. When he asked her, taking his
cue from a song that was being played: “Are you a New York lady?” she pulled
her arms up, pulled up her shoulders, closed her eyes, smiled, and made a two-
tone noise. She has seen her behave in a similar way towards Physio L.
According to Care Worker W, M seems to turn her head more and listen if a
man is speaking.68
M engages in complex activities like watching television and responding appropriately
to instructions and questions. When asked ‘what she thought of so-and-so’s hair . . .
M has responded by opening her eyes and looking at the person’s hair’.69 M’s interest
in hair underlines her connection with her past life as a hairdresser, and more, her ac-
tions are positive, contrasting to the discourse of the family that emphasises what
M cannot do, and denies the meaningfulness of what she can.70 Her carers’ evidence
stresses M’s response to music. She smiles, hums, and mouths the words to songs, be-
coming animated in response to some, while being reduced to tears by others.71
The mouthing of words, together with her contrasting emotional response to different
63 ibid [118].
64 ibid [116].
65 ibid [126].
66 ibid [172].
67 ibid [160].
68 ibid [171].
69 ibid [128].
70 ibid [108].
71 ibid [154].
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melodies hints a rich, internalised emotional life. Her active inner existence is not con-
ﬁned to response to music:
M was present there while [a wedding DVD] was being played and got quite
emotional, making a crying sound, although she wasn’t shedding any tears.72
Compelling as such a portrait is, there are elements of these reports which raise some
disquiet. The carers’ evidence lacks consistency—for example, only two carers report
hearing speech (and neither account is corroborated). Even M’s most predominant
behaviour, smiling, is not observed by her most frequent carers, C and L.73
Irregular reports might be explained; it is a feature of character that shows a differ-
ent face to different people.74 Baker J acknowledges that some witnesses may have
over-interpreted their evidence—indeed he also notes that a physiotherapist misrepre-
sents hearsay as his own observations.75 M’s alleged interest in, and ﬂirtation with,
men lends itself most to accusations of overwrought interpretation. That M regularly
avoids the gaze of others seems evidentially relatively secure. Yet this observation is
often coupled with a construal of ﬂirting76 that makes highly suppositional inferences
about character and attitudes. Nevertheless, Baker J (with few caveats) accepts the evi-
dence as given. Even with warnings of over-interpretation, the evidence thus retains
its impact on the way the person of M is perceived. In the face of this narrative, the
counter-narrative of the family recedes, while the person who cries, laughs, ﬂirts, and
plays with others is written large. The question that remains is whether such a narra-
tive should have been introduced at all, given the power it holds and the tenuous evi-
dence on which it is based.
B. James: Happy and Determined
The narrative of the family in W v M77 turns on M’s autonomy, but M’s sanctity of
life determines the case. This is the only case examined in this article where sanctity
of life predominates. The three rulings on the case of David James78 again contain di-
chotomous claims about the identity of the patient, but this time autonomy, eventu-
ally, prevails. On their way to this conclusion the judgments indicate the dramatically
different conclusions that can follow from an emphasis on either a happy and deter-
mined character, or on the burdens of treatment. The Court of Protection judgment
prefers the former, simultaneously deprecating the medical narrative, while the Court
of Appeal judgment favours the latter. The Supreme Court judgment modulates these
narratives. While it is a hugely signiﬁcant ruling, it is only of peripheral interest to my
theme, and will not be discussed at length.
72 ibid [161].
73 ibid [139, 144].
74 ibid [174].
75 ibid [154].
76 ibid [138, 143 and 171].
77 ibid.
78 James (n 15) and its earlier instances NHS v DJ [2012] EWHC 3524 and NHS v James [2013] EWCA
Civ 65.
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The case concerned withholding prospective treatments, including resuscitation
and renal therapy, from critically ill David James. Mr James, a former professional mu-
sician, was in MCS, but retained the ability to interact with his surroundings, albeit at
a basic level. At ﬁrst instance, the hospital’s plan to limit treatment was rejected.
Jackson J found that the unanimous medical evidence took insufﬁcient account of the
non-medical aspects of Mr James’ circumstances. The NHS Trust appealed and,
Mr James having further deteriorated, the appeal was granted and the treatments with-
held. Mr James died soon after, but an appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed.
In her judgment Lady Hale P was critical of the method by which the Court of
Appeal had determined the case. In particular she took issue with the Court of
Appeal’s interpretation of the concept of futility, and commented favourably upon the
more person-centred approach of the Court of Protection. Nevertheless, she agreed
with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, given the deterioration of Mr James by
that point.
The Supreme Court judgment79 thus simultaneously endorsed the verdict of the
Court of Appeal and the approach of the Court of Protection. In this sense it takes an
emollient approach. It contains some analysis of Mr James’ character but this essen-
tially repeats the analysis in the earlier judgments. The Supreme Court’s use of charac-
ter can be best understood by analysing these earlier cases. I shall thus consider these,
rather than the Supreme Court judgment.
The ﬁrst decision80 concentrates on the interactive, family-orientated aspects of
Mr James’ character. This includes a lengthy extract from the expert witness called by
the Ofﬁcial Solicitor, describing a visit to Mr James’ bedside:
DJ showed clear signs of recognition, smiled at [his family’s] approach and
mouthed what appeared to be words. He seemed to know appropriately when
asked if he was feeling alright by his wife. She combed DJ’s hair, during which
DJ smiled. DJ was given a paper to read by his son. DJ turned the pages with his
left arm.81
The report, while clearly indicating that Mr James suffers cognitive impairment, em-
phasises his interest in his family, his surroundings, and his contented nature. It is
noted on three occasions in the statement that Mr James smiles, and the judgment
notes this again in evidence drawn from the Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s case manager.82 Five of
six observations included from the medical staff83 relate to smiling or laughing.
Evidence from Mr James’ family, as well as echoing these reports, suggests the rich-
ness of Mr James’ experience. Mr James ‘worries’ about his family,84 and joins in with
jokes.85
79 James, ibid.
80 NHS v DJ (n 78).
81 ibid [33].
82 Ibid [34].
83 Ibid [35].
84 Ibid [61].
85 ibid [66].
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By contrast, the medical evidence in this instance presents a detailed, but coolly
technical, assessment of the past treatment failures and future treatment risks. The
ability of medical evidence to provide an objective view is repeatedly challenged: evi-
dence from the ‘impressive’86 Dr G dwells at length on Mr James’ frailty and poor
chances of recovery. Jackson J emphasises Dr G’s admission that treatments so far
had ‘worked’, including antibiotics that were given under pressure from the family.87
Jackson J deﬂects negative connotations of the diagnosis of MCS. He says Mr James’
level of consciousness ‘might more accurately be described [as] very limited rather
than minimal’.88 Meanwhile, Dr G observes that Mr James’ awareness is ‘better with
his family than with members of staff, even those with whom he is familiar’.89
The objectivity of medical evidence is further brought into question by the conduct
of the expert witness instructed by the Ofﬁcial Solicitor, Dr Danbury. He states in his
ﬁrst report that he considers medical treatment inappropriate because, inter alia ‘I
have collected signiﬁcant evidence that leaves me with the view that DJ would prefer
to be dead rather than be unable to make music’.90 This statement is singled out for
special condemnation by Jackson J, who observes
The only basis for this last observation was a conversation with a nursing sister
who says that DJ had apparently told another member of staff early in his admis-
sion to intensive care that he would prefer to die than not be able to play the
guitar. Not surprisingly, DJ’s family has been distressed at the use to which Dr
Danbury put this snippet of information91
Despite the redaction of the offending comment, Jackson J indicates Dr Danbury’s
credibility as a witness is fatally undermined. His amended report is not admitted as
evidence of Mr James’ best interests. Yet arguably it is not clear from the judgment
why such a statement should be of no interest to the court, or even subordinate to
other suppositions about Mr James’ character. We might infer that second-hand re-
ports of ‘apparent’ conversations are of low evidential weight, but this inference is not
made explicit. There is no suggestion that the source lacks credibility. Rather the
problem seems to be that the statement was a ‘snippet of information’ and isolated
from the prevailing narrative. Great store is also set on the fact that the statement
caused the family distress.
Sparing the family distress is a laudable concern, yet if the focus is on the best in-
terests of the patient, it may not withstand the need to obtain full and frank evidence.
It is also reasonable to think that an isolated remark was not indicative of Mr James’
antecedent wishes. However, it is not unreasonable to imagine that there are some
things a patient may prefer to share with a health professional, but not a family mem-
ber, as their distress evidences. Admitting this narrative would undermine the sense
that Mr James’ close family life gives his family special insight into his likely wishes.
86 ibid [47].
87 ibid [44–45]; also consider [64, 67].
88 ibid [38].
89 ibid [42].
90 ibid [57].
91 ibid [58].
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Ultimately the court’s position seems to be that only certain indications of patient
character are admissible to the assessment of best interests. Such a stance seems liable
to result in quite partial assessments of the patient.
In the Court of Appeal the way the evidence is considered is ostensibly similar
to the ﬁrst decision. The judgment reiterates the evidence about Mr James’ charac-
ter (although this time in summary), concluding ‘DJ showed his resilience and
great determination to recover. . . . He was a remarkable man.’92 Despite this simi-
larity, the Court of Appeal judgment adds extremely lengthy (they run for seven
pages) extracts from the medical testimony. These emphasise the distressing side
effects of Mr James’ treatment or proposed treatment. Because these detail ex-
changes between counsel for the NHS Trust and the medical witnesses, they are
highly emotive in effect. Thus they contrast strongly with the bland list of harms
and risks that characterise the earlier NHS v DJ93 and give the medical evidence
dramatic prominence. For example, under questioning, Dr G explains that pro-
longed vasoconstrictive effects of heart stimulating medicines like adrenaline result
in mummiﬁed digits:
[Mr James] has necrotic toes, he has a number of black toes which are as a result
arguably or actually probably very consistently of the treatment that we’ve ad-
ministered to him.94
Similarly Dr G explains that the renal therapy, which he believes is against Mr James’
best interests, causes an extreme, protracted drop in body temperature:
What we see very commonly is a shivering or cold response, that is one we try
and mitigate against but we see very frequently so we induce a very unpleasant
experience. . . . if you were to see a member of the public who is out and who is
exhibiting you know clear distress from cold, shaking and so on. [This lasts]
about sort of 24 hours course.95
Sir Alan Ward’s intention in such lengthy recounting of the medical evidence is osten-
sibly to inform the family,96 yet the effect is also to graphically emphasise the burden
of treatment. In this instance then, character is relegated to a secondary role next to
the side effects of intensive care treatment. Mr James, as much as he can be seen, may
be resilient, but we might ask if it is fair to call on such resilience in the face of a series
of grim side effects and ghastly sequelae. Thus, in these two decisions, changing em-
phasis from Mr James as smiling family man to critically ill patient is used to frame op-
posing conclusions.
92 NHS v James (n 78) [13].
93 NHS v DJ (n 78).
94 NHS v James (n 78) [22].
95 ibid [23].
96 ibid [26].
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C. Lincolnshire v N: Independent and Resistant
Like the decisions about David James, Lincolnshire v N97 focuses predominantly on
the patient’s current behaviours, drawing on character to drive a narrative about best
interests. There is agreement about N’s vulnerability, but disagreement about what ac-
tion is incumbent on her carers as a result.
N was a woman in her early ﬁfties who had been in a MCS for 13 months follow-
ing a brain haemorrhage. Attempts at rehabilitation had been fruitless. N had been
moved to a care home, where, after 4 months, her feeding tube was found to be dis-
lodged. The court heard that movements of N’s left arm had interfered with clinical
interventions since admission. A review by a consultant neurologist concluded these
movements were likely to be a response to sensory stimulus rather than volitional in
nature. This notwithstanding, the movements frustrated attempts to resume ANH,
and N dislodged replacement feeding tubes in a variety of ways. Replacing the feeding
tube in an alternative site on N’s abdomen (that might be at less risk of dislodgement)
was discounted by N’s surgeon. His opinion was that this risked the potentially fatal
consequence of food accidentally entering N’s abdominal cavity if the tube, again, was
dislodged. Lacking a satisfactory medical solution, the Hospital Trust applied for a
declaration of the lawfulness of non-feeding. The case reached the court as an emer-
gency, N having been without nutrition for more than a month by this time. The
court heard evidence from N’s family that N would not have wished for feeding to
continue, and the family strongly believed that N’s arm movements were an indication
of this wish. Paufﬂey J held that medical treatment was no longer in N’s best interests.
Nutrition was therefore been withheld and intravenous ﬂuids withdrawn. This was
due to the lack of prospects of recovery and the risks involved in resiting the feeding
tube, but N’s views and her families wishes were taken into account.
N’s character is primarily mooted in evidence from N’s daughters and estranged
husband. They argued that N had been a private person who would wish for her pri-
vacy to be respected. A cousin said of N’s character that ‘even when young, N did not
enjoy being touched; and so the necessity of having everything done for her, as now,
must be intolerable for N’.98 N’s daughter reported that N had said to a friend that
she would ‘not like to continue life in a reduced capacity’99 should she be hurt in a car
accident.
The family, then, suggested that N’s rejection of ANH was intentional, and consis-
tent with both her (lifelong) private character and antecedent statements. Crucially,
despite the contrary opinion expressed in the consultant neurologist’s report,100 the
court treats the volitionality of N’s obstructive movements as an open question.
Paufﬂey J gives signiﬁcant weight to the opinion of the jointly instructed expert,
Dr Jones, a consultant gastroenterologist:
[Dr Jones] formed the opinion that N’s awareness of his presence was recognis-
able and that she did not want him to examine her. . . . He states that “it is
97 Lincolnshire v N (n 38).
98 ibid [32].
99 ibid [30].
100 ibid [20].
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possible that despite her severe cognitive impairment as part of her [MCS], she
is able to express her refusal of these treatments”101
The diagnostic criteria for MCS include the localisation of noxious stimuli, automatic
movements like scratching and purposeful reaching for objects. Yet, the severity of the
cognitive disability that accompanies a diagnosis of MCS implies little understanding
of the consequences of a behaviour. Analysis of the adequacy of any refusal that N’s
behaviours express is missing from the judgment. Dr Jones’ evidence is persistently
worded to paint N’s actions in a volitional light102 and Paufﬂey J summarises N’s clini-
cal course in similar terms:
On admission, N was frequently resistant to physical interventions including
routine observations and personal care - pushing staff away with her left hand
. . . N shows no inclination or ability to eat or drink103
Paufﬂey J describes Dr Jones in exceptionally glowing terms: he is ‘not only a gastro-
enterologist of very great experience and expertise he is also an individual of enor-
mous compassion and great insight into the human condition’.104 Nevertheless,
Paufﬂey J’s reasons for preferring Dr Jones’ evidence are obscure, given Dr Jones’
opinion of N’s neurology is both outside his speciality and contradicts the evidence of
the relevant specialist.
The ratio of the court is grounded, quite reasonably, in N’s poor prognosis and, signif-
icantly, the lack of available life-saving options. Yet N’s views, and her family’s wishes, are
taken into account and it is the character and volitional elements that most strongly fea-
ture in the judgment, and underwrite a narrative of upholding patient autonomy.
Behaviours of patients with disorders of consciousness are notoriously ambiguous, so this
seems to be a precarious rationale.105 In this case, N’s current behaviours, which the
court has heard are a reﬂexive response and, according to the most relevant expert opin-
ion, undertaken without volition, are consistently portrayed as not only volitional, but
amounting to N’s understanding that they will result in her death. Evidence from N’s
family of N’s past character is used to further support this narrative. Yet to ﬁnd that N’s
current behaviour is a manifestation of her earlier character in order to offer a narrative
of cogent treatment refusal is a radical claim. The underlying reasons for making such a
claim will be examined shortly, after we have analysed our ﬁnal case,M v N.106
D. M v N: Selﬁsh and Feisty
Late in 2015 Hayden J heard the case of M v N,107 which is the ﬁnal case I analyse
here. In reaching the decision the judge draws on extensive testimony of the patient’s
101 ibid [37].
102 ibid [35].
103 ibid [13n14].
104 ibid [62].
105 RJ Jox and others, ‘Diagnosis and Decision Making for Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: A Survey
among Family Members’ (2015) 96 Arch Phys Med Rehabil 323.
106 M v N (n 38); For alternative commentary originating from this project: Huxtable (n 36).
107 ibid.
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family about the patient’s past character. This draws out two traits: her selﬁshness,
and her pugnacious approach to life.
N was a 68-year-old woman in the advanced stages of MS. N had lost capacity
many years before the application, and was now agreed to be in MCS. Withdrawal of
ANH was proposed in a court action that arose from her daughter’s concerns over
N’s quality of life. The court heard detailed evidence from N’s family about her lack of
acceptance of her diagnosis and her often violent resistance to others’ attempts to
care for her. The application was unopposed by N’s clinicians, who agreed she had no
prospect of recovery. Hayden J concluded that this was a matter where personal au-
tonomy outweighed concern for the sanctity of life and granted the application to
withdraw treatment.
The evidence from her family was that N had been a difﬁcult person who coped
badly with her chronic illness. The court heard that N’s difﬁcult character had been
apparent long before her diagnosis.108 Indeed, the evidence suggests N’s difﬁcult be-
haviour caused her divorce and her alienation from her teenage daughter (who chose
to live with her father after the separation).109 N’s challenging character, then, was
deep rooted, and in full health she was allegedly vain, shallow and selﬁsh. Her family
said that they ‘all knew her as a woman for whom outward or public appearance was
enormously important’.110 She had been dissolute, ‘“lived to shop”. [and] “loved the
good life”’.111 Hayden J felt ‘sure that there were occasions where Mrs N rather tested
[her husband] with her occasional proﬂigacy’.112 She had been caustic and ‘withering
and coruscating in her condemnation of people’.113
Once diagnosed with MS, N’s already challenging character was ampliﬁed. She had
become depressed and had refused to engage with her diagnosis.114 She had rejected
equipment provided to prevent falls, endangering her safety so she consequently suf-
fered potentially serious accidents.115 She had appeared unable or unwilling to take re-
sponsibility for her own health. Her recklessness with her own well-being was
mirrored in the disregard she had shown for the well-being of others. She
. . .was frequently in low mood, screaming, crying and hitting staff. . . . by March
2006 it seems Mrs. N’s behaviour had escalated such that she was considered to
be violent to her carers.116
N’s uncooperativeness, violence, and aggression alienated others. The court heard she
had sustained very few close relationships.117
108 ibid [4].
109 ibid [5],[53].
110 ibid [52].
111 ibid [52].
112 ibid [53].
113 ibid [6].
114 ibid [4],[10].
115 ibid [8–10].
116 ibid [10].
117 ibid [6].
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While this assessment is bleak, Hayden J also emphasises what he claims are more
positive traits. He recounts N’s courageous ﬁght for legal recognition and support for
her illegitimate son, defying the moralising of her community.118 Further, she had
adored her own parents, and was ‘heartbroken’119 when they were diagnosed with de-
mentia. Yet the details of this story add to an unsympathetic portrait of N:
Mrs. N’s reaction to this shocked her husband and both her children. She hated
seeing [her parents] in such a diminished state . . . L and the children visited
regularly but even under pressure Mrs. N would only go rarely. [N’s daughter]
recalls her mother saying, at the time, ‘if I ever get like that shoot me!’120
This evidence is used by Hayden J to make a moral determination of N’s character.
She was ‘capricious, selﬁsh and seemingly shallow . . . immensely “proud”, jealous of
her privacy, extraordinarily “feisty” . . . profoundly loyal to her children’121
Determining that such character traits give rise to a strong indication of her wishes
Hayden J concludes:
[her family infer] she is a strong enough personality to take control of how she
lives out the remaining period of her life. . . . I have no difﬁculty in accepting the
family’s view that she would not wish to continue as she is.122
Hayden J moulds N’s story into a plaintive cry for autonomy.123 Yet, perhaps more
than any of the cases considered here, the way character is used inspires disquiet. N’s
behaviour and diagnosis invites an analysis that puts autonomy onto a more question-
able footing. There is a known association between MS and a range of psychiatric con-
ditions,124 and neurological changes associated with MS may result in pathological
personality changes.125 That MS may have manifested in disturbances of N’s mind
seems to have been considered, at least in passing, by Hayden J who observes:
It may be that for sometime prior to her diagnosis the disorder had begun to
have its effect on her general functioning. . . . Within six years of diagnosis she
became wheel chair dependent, struggled with concentration, experienced rapid
mood changes and difﬁculties with her memory.126
118 ibid [51].
119 ibid [57].
120 ibid [55].
121 ibid [50].
122 ibid [59–60].
123 See also Shefﬁeld v TH (n 38).
124 RJ Siegert and DA Abernethy, ‘Depression in Multiple Sclerosis: A Review’ (2005) 76 J Neurol Neurosurg
Psych 469
125 RH Benedict and others, ‘Personality Disorder in Multiple Sclerosis Correlates with Cognitive Impairment’
(2001) 13 J Neuropsych Clin Neurosci 70; LB Strober and others, ‘Unemployment in Multiple Sclerosis:
The Contribution of Personality and Disease’ (2012) 18 J Mult Scler 647.
126 M v N (n 38) [4–6].
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N’s purportedly disagreeable character is well documented and precedes her diagnosis
of MS. It is impossible to say with any certainty whether these character traits them-
selves were pathological. Nevertheless, if N’s behaviours were symptoms of an under-
lying disease process, it shows a remarkably facile approach to mental illness to link
these behaviours to autonomy, since the presence of a mental illness raises fundamen-
tal questions about N’s agency. But perhaps this goes too far. The presence of MS
suggests that there was no treatment available that would have arrested N’s antisocial
behaviours in the long term. Finding that the effects of MS may have altered N’s rea-
soning is therefore unlikely to have altered the ﬁnal determination of best interests in
this case. Nevertheless, we should be suspicious of a narrative designed to champion
autonomy.
Even without such supposition there is a greater question lurking here. All of these
cases could be solved less problematically by looking to the wishes of the family or
the futility of treatment— indeed, the latter frequently features in the ratio. We might
explain the discussion of character in these judgments as a simple reassurance to fami-
lies. By suggesting that the outcome is ‘what the patient would have wanted’, we ad-
dress the burden of responsibility or distress that families may otherwise carry. Yet the
discussion of character is too frequent and extensive for this to be a wholly satisfactory
explanation. The way it is used in these judgments maps onto particular philosophical
perspectives of well-being. These may resemble accounts that say what we desire is
what is best for us, although this account is particularly problematic when employed
in instances of antecedent decision-making.127 This notwithstanding, the courts argu-
ably appear to be doing something else. Instead of simply giving expression to auton-
omy and choice, the courts appear to be uniquely concerned with using narratives of
character to facilitate autonomy, regardless of whether autonomy is desired by the pa-
tient. This suggests that the law, rather than allowing self-expression, says that self-
expression is a, or perhaps the, primary property of being human. I will explore these
philosophical perspectives now.
IV . THEORETICAL BASES OF CHARACTER EVALUATION AND
WELL-BEING
In all of these cases character plays a prominent role in the determination of well-be-
ing. While best interests are held in common law to encompass a plethora of medical,
emotional, and other interests, an increasingly narrow focus on antecedent desire sug-
gests inconsistencies between this approach and the autonomy focus of best interests
in the MCA 2005. This inconsistency may be driven by a determination to increase
the role of substituted judgement in deciding best interests.128 By using the patient’s
character to determine their best interests, there is prima facie a close link between
this approach and desire accounts of well-being. To remind ourselves, these accounts
suggest that a person’s life will go best if we satisfy their preferences. They are ‘proba-
bly the dominant view of welfare among economists, social scientists, and philoso-
phers’.129 Yet closer examination of MCS cases suggests a more sophisticated
127 Hayes (n 61).
128 I thank my anonymous peer-reviewer for this observation.
129 W Shaw, ‘Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism’ (Blackwell Publishing 1999) 53.
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understanding may be necessary, for the facts of the cases present multiple problems
for a desire account.
An unembellished desire account might suggest that satisfaction of any desire at
any time enhances welfare. To understand the problems of applying desire accounts
to MCS, we need to understand that few (if any) theorists defend such an account.
Most desire-theorists specify signiﬁcant caveats. These include that welfare-enhancing
desires should: be fully informed (either using ideal outcomes or by considering all
possible personal effects of a desire); be correctly motivated (not sordid, or mischie-
vous, or inane); come into effect at a time when I exist (not after I die); and enter my
awareness.130 Given the scale of the incapacity of the patients in the cases I have con-
sidered, there seems little chance that their desires can match these criteria.
Antecedent desires concerning treatment refusal (in the form of an ADRT or an
LPA) may represent a realistic compromise,131 especially if they satisfy at least some
of these criteria. Yet none of the descriptions of antecedent wishes in these cases
come anywhere near to doing so, nor are they engaged under the current legal frame-
work. Indeed, at most the cases contain impressionistic sketches of the patient’s val-
ues. By directing these sketches towards actual decisions, the law seems to be doing
something additional to, or even different from, establishing antecedent desire. Rather
it seems to be saying that to possess these antecedent desires is a necessary precondi-
tion to our well-being.
The fervent commitment of the law to facilitating the autonomy of the patient de-
spite any counterfactuals suggests a fetishisation of autonomy that goes beyond a de-
sire account of well-being. It seems much closer to an ‘objective list’ account of well-
being,132 which offers a simple list of the states of affairs that are necessary for well-be-
ing that is separate from a person’s desires or pleasures. Speciﬁcally, the approach in
these cases resembles an objective list account of well-being where autonomy is a pri-
mary (and in some cases the primary) item. As I will explain below, this approach re-
sembles a speciﬁc type of objective list account named the ‘perfectionist’ account of
well-being.
A. Perfectionist Accounts of Well-Being
To recap, objective list accounts of well-being contain lists of states of affairs that are
good for people, whether or not they desire them or derive pleasure from them.133
Objective lists commonly contain items relating to moral goodness,134 rationality,135
aesthetic awareness,136 and friendship,137 yet usually lack coherent explanation of why
these items should be included. They suffer the criticism that they are arbitrary and
130 C Heathwood, ‘Desire Fulﬁlment Theory’ in in Fletcher (n 8) 135.
131 Whatever their philosophical validity. Justifying antecedent wishes on the basis of a desire account raises
many objections eg whether changes in our bodies and/or minds result in us becoming, to all moral pur-
poses, different people. See Parﬁt (n 28) 219–43; Hayes (n 61).
132 Fletcher (n 32).
133 ibid.
134 G Fletcher, ‘A Fresh Start for the Objective List Theory of Well-being’ (2013) 25 Utilitas 206; Parﬁt (n 28) 499.
135 Parﬁt, ibid.
136 ibid; J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Claredon Press 1980); M Murphy, ‘Natural Law and
Practical Rationality’ (CUP 2001).
137 Finnis, ibid; Fletcher (n 134); Murphy, ibid.
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lack the theoretical depth to explain why the items they list are important or how they
should be weighed.138 In order to provide this theoretical depth, perfectionist ac-
counts look to theories of what constitutes a virtuous life. Theories of the virtuous life
are drawn from virtue ethics.139 Put simply, this is based on the Aristotelian view that
things should have ‘virtues’ (a¯ 2qsai) to be good examples of what they are.
Certain human virtues are related to moral character. These moral virtues are part of
the fabric of the individual: who we are, not what we do, marks moral excellence.
Scholars in the virtue ethics tradition argue that human virtues can be identiﬁed by
observing human conduct, language, and psychology.140 Accounts of virtue are diverse
but common accounts include virtues such as truthfulness, courage, and non-
malevolence.141
According to perfectionist accounts, these virtues can be used to identify the natu-
ral human capacities (such as rationality and autonomy) that are necessary to live a
virtuous life.142 As one account has it, virtues arise from human nature; we can iden-
tify certain capacities that all humans need in order to have a virtuous existence, and
populate an objective list with these capacities.143 Exercising these capacities in a virtu-
ous way will then allow a person to live a virtuous existence. Arguably this describes
an objective list account of well-being with a ﬁrm theoretical grounding.144
Perfectionist accounts generally suggest the capacities necessary for human well-being
centre upon basic levels of health, some form of rationality, and moral autonomy.145
The prospects for the well-being of a patient in MCS might appear slender, since,
however their health is perceived, they are capable of exercising neither rational nor
moral autonomy. On one hand then, a perfectionist account may suggest that even a
putatively content patient like David James146 lacks the fundamental capacities to
achieve well-being. However, when faced with a person whose capacities are ob-
structed, we might instead attempt to promote their well-being by fostering these ca-
pacities. If a patient were rational and autonomous, but unwell, it would be
uncontroversial to try to heal them. Therefore, to return to the example of David
James, we might promote his rationality and his moral autonomy to allow foster his
well-being. I suggest we can shelve any appraisal of the former (here), given the requi-
site levels of rationality are arguably implicit in judicial decisions. Instead, let us focus
on autonomy.
138 B Bradley,Well-being and Death (OUP 2009).
139 Virtue ethics is a contemporary reinvigoration of Aristotelian ethics. See GEM Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral
Philosophy’ (1958) 33 Philosophy 1; for critique, see Doris (n 3).
140 R Hursthouse and G Pettigrove, ‘Virtue Ethics’ in EN Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2016 edn) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-virtue/> ac-
cessed 15 August 2016.
141 Miller (n 54).
142 D Dorsey, ‘Three Arguments for Perfectionism’ (2010) 44 Nouˆs 59; A Baril, ‘Virtue and Wellbeing’ in
Fletcher (n 8) 242.
143 Bradford (n 8).
144 Eg S Darwall, ‘Welfare and Rational Care’ (Princeton University Press 2002); M Lebar, ‘Good for You’
(2004) 85 Pac Philos Q 195.
145 ibid; Bradford (n 8).
146 James (n 15).
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Promoting moral autonomy, despite the roots of this account in virtue ethics, does
not require a judge to make a ﬁnal judgment of the patient’s virtue (although, as we
see inM v N,147 such sentiments may follow). Instead they need only appeal to a core
account of human capabilities that are necessary to achieve well-being. Such a claim
clearly coincides with the emphasis on autonomy within the MCA 2005. A perfection-
ist account of well-being manifests in the following way: where the wishes of the inca-
pacitated patient are not clear, best interests are engaged in line with section 4.6(b). A
determination of the beliefs and values of the patient is made according to the pa-
tient’s character. The patient in a MCS is assumed to have cogent wishes, but to lack
the ability to act upon them. As the cases in our series demonstrate, a judge needs
only search for these wishes in the patient’s character and supply the means by giving
effect to these wishes. This allows the patient in MCS to exercise this autonomous ca-
pability according to their own ends. If they wish, the judges (and thus the liberal
state) may remain scrupulously neutral about whether such an end is virtuous.
V. CRITICISMS OF PERFECTIONIST THEORIES OF WELL-BEING IN
THE LAW
Identiﬁcation of this theoretical underpinning provides several grounds for criticism
of the law. For example, critics of perfectionist approaches suggest the claim that an
objective list can be created from an account of human nature is fallacious, because
the concept of human nature is innately problematic.148 In terms of the MCA 2005
this raises questions about the value given to autonomy in its application: even if au-
tonomy is a generally valid basis on which to make decisions, there may be excep-
tions.149 In the context of MCS we could suggest autonomy occupies too dominant a
position, risking drowning out other important factors, such as social relationships.
Further questions arise if we critically examine the theoretical bases of perfectionist
approaches, particularly their connection to the ‘common-sense’ approach to charac-
ter found in virtue ethics. More enlightened approaches to character raises questions
about the degree to which character can be understood within a narrative structure,
especially in an adversarial system of law. Evidence from the psychological literature
further supports these concerns, especially the validity of understanding character as
composed of enduring traits. The ﬁnal part of this article considers these criticisms in
turn.
A. Autonomy
The importance of autonomy in medical jurisprudence is well established, and appar-
ently increasing.150 There is very widespread agreement that respect for autonomy is
ethically important:151 its diffusion into medical practice has been argued to be the
147 M v N (n 38).
148 Dorsey (n 142).
149 P Bielby, ‘The Conﬂation of Competence and Capacity in English Medical Law: A Philosophical Critique’
(2005) 8 Med Health Care Philos 357.
150 Eg Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 11; Wye Valley v B [2015] EWCOP 60; Re C [2015] EWCOP
80.
151 D Archard, ‘Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership’ (2008) 25 J Appl Philos 19.
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major achievement of bioethics.152 Where the patient lacks capacity, an advance deci-
sion or an LPA, our cases suggest the Court of Protection may give expression to a pa-
tient’s autonomy using evidence from the patient’s character. While this article lacks
the scope to ground a general criticism of autonomy, giving such weight to autonomy
in cases involving MCS raises questions about the consistency of autonomy as a con-
cept in the law. As autonomy is far from being a single, uniﬁed, concept much de-
pends on the conception of autonomy that is being deployed and this is often opaque.
The Kantian conception of autonomy suggests an individual requirement to exercise
rational agency, and emphasis on capacity to make decisions in the MCA 2005 speaks
most readily to this approach.153 The conception of autonomy attributed to J.S. Mill
is more suggestive of a freedom to live as one wishes that relates to the protection of
the liberty of minorities.154 An increasing emphasis on Millian liberty is detectable in
the desire to extend equality to the vulnerable and voiceless in recent Court of
Protection cases, including, signiﬁcantly, M v N.155 Thus, these cases suggest concep-
tual inconsistencies between statutory and common law interpretations of autonomy.
At a minimum, this may cause judgments to be unpredictable, with all the problems
this implies.156
Even ignoring these inconsistencies, the appropriateness of autonomy to the cir-
cumstances of MCS cases seems questionable. Critique of the ethic of autonomy high-
lights its overshadowing of the value that people place on interpersonal
relationships.157 Others contend an emphasis on autonomy denigrates the essentially
caring nature of patient–professional relationships in healthcare.158 Such criticisms
seem especially cogent here, despite the sensitivity Judges in our case series undoubt-
edly showed to relational issues. Such sensitivity could conceivably give voice to rela-
tionality and care while emphasising autonomy by expressing, for example,
autonomous wishes that others decide on one’s behalf. Yet the predominant approach
in the case series was to craft family or professional narratives into expressions of au-
tonomy. Since many patients will be in MCS following sudden, acute events, planning
for this event is likely to be rare.159 In the absence of an ADRT or LPA, by seeking an
autonomy-based narrative based on character judges risk overlooking the great variety
of human impulses regarding impending death, including patients having no plans
whatsoever. One typology suggested the forty-two residents of four Hong-Kong
152 JF Childress, ‘The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics’ (1990) 20 Hastings Cent Rep 12; R Gillon, ‘Ethics
Needs Principles - Four Can Encompass the Rest - and Respect for Autonomy Should Be "First Among
Equals”’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 307.
153 J Coggon and J Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-Making’ (2011) 70 CLJ 523.
154 Archard (n 151).
155 ‘to superimpose what the Court thinks best, may result in indirect discrimination. The central objective is to
avoid a paternalistic approach and to ensure that the incapacitous achieve equality with the capacitous’. M v
N (n 38) (Hayden J) [30]; AlsoWye Valley v B (n 150) [11].
156 Huxtable and Birchley (n 36).
157 A MacLean, ‘Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge’ (CUP 2009); MA
Verkerk and others, ‘Where Families and Healthcare Meet’ (2015) 41 J Med Ethics 183.
158 MacLean, ibid; A Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice (Routledge 2008).
159 J Kitzinger and C Kitzinger, ‘The “Window of Opportunity” for Death after Severe Brain Injury: Family
Experiences’ (2013) 35 Sociol Health Illn 1095.
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care homes demonstrated at least ﬁve different approaches to end-of-life decision-
making.160 Some residents wanted treatment at any cost. Others variously favoured
independence, making a judgment based on the burdens of treatment, trusting in fate
and trusting their doctors. This hints at a multiplicity of approaches to death that we
may overlook by emphasising autonomy-based narratives of a good death in every
circumstance.
B. The Weakness of Narrative
If a ﬁxation on using the lens of autonomy to view human nature is concerning, the
suitability of the courts as a venue for such work also raises questions that are quite
separate from those raised by autonomy. Adversarial law tends to frame facts in partial
ways, seeking a relatively solid and homogenous view of the patient’s wishes, feelings,
beliefs and values. It is appealing to argue, as judges frequently do, that those closest
to us know us best and can offer important reﬂections on our interests. This under-
standing of the self is vulnerable to the established view that the self is essentially so-
cially constructed. As Mead observes:
We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are
one thing to one man and another thing to another. There are parts of the self
that exist only for the self in relationship to itself. We divide ourselves up in all
sorts of different social interactions. It is the social process itself that is responsi-
ble for the appearance of the self161
Such a view is, broadly speaking, accepted in contemporary understandings of the
self.162 The implication is not only that we must canvass widely to understand the
self, but also that the self is not itself truly apprehensible to anyone other than the
subject. Such a position, while upholding the preference for an advance decision in
MCA 2005 at section 4(6)(a), raises questions about how we might gain the knowl-
edge sought by section 4(6)(b) in the absence of such a decision with any degree of
certainty. Certainly, the adversarial nature of common law encourages particular
views of persons and events, suggesting it is an unsuitable arena to collect the multi-
tude of narratives that might offer any glimpse of the person ‘in the round’.
Adversarial law, in its search for narratives, will make choices about the way evidence
is presented. The partiality of judicial narratives in common law has long been under-
stood, especially, although not exclusively,163 in the criminal law.164 There, scholars
have noted the way that narratives are shaped and moulded according to the needs
of protagonists:
160 HY Chan and SM Pang, ‘Readiness of Chinese Frail Old Age Home Residents Towards End-of-life Care
Decision-making’ (2011) 20 J Clin Nurs 1454.
161 GHMead,Mind, Self and Society (University of Chicago Press 1934).
162 Holstein and Gubrium (n 2).
163 Eg D Cowan and E Hitchings, ‘Pretty Boring Stuff’: District Judges and Housing Possession Proceedings’
(2007) 16 Soc Leg Stud 363.
164 Winter (n 4); Nicholson (n 47).
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form of argument, selection of witnesses and evidence is governed by counsel’s
need to present a plausible account . . . the judge adopts [similar] methods of
argument165
Adversarial law implies a need to select and favour evidence in order to devise a com-
pelling, unfolding narrative, while discrediting elements contrary to that narrative.
It may be protested that differences between criminal and civil law imply less adversar-
ial approaches in MCS cases. Nevertheless, the ability of the civil courts to construct
partial narratives has been noted elsewhere,166 and seems amply made out by the dif-
ferences between the focus of the Court of Protection and Court of Appeal in James.
Even in a potentially diminished form, adversariality is clearly an impediment to using
narrative to furnish a robust description of character. Instead, such a description must
seek as many narrative threads as possible, canvassing widely among those who knew
the person if it is to do justice to the dynamic nature of the self.167
C. Character in Psychology
Judges must determine best interests, and to do so means determining—or perhaps
constructing—the wishes and beliefs of the patient. In the cases we have examined we
have seen these wishes and beliefs are based on a narrative that draws heavily on char-
acter. I have questioned the emphasis on autonomy in the circumstances of MCS, and
suggested that the adversarial nature of the law may lead us to overly partial narratives.
As I shall discuss now, these problems are multiplied by the weakness of character as
a predictor of decisions.
The majority of contemporary personality psychology follows the ‘ﬁve-factor’
model. This proposes that personality traits can be measured along ﬁve continua.168
One of the major criticisms of this approach is that individuals do not consistently re-
produce personality traits when they are measured repeatedly across different situa-
tions.169 The seminal study of this issue170 measured honest and dishonest behaviour
in 8,000 schoolchildren. It found that the level of correlation between a child’s
(dis)honest behaviours and the situations in which their honesty was tested was ex-
tremely low. For example, children who readily cheated when given the opportunity
to inﬂate written test scores did not reliably do the same when given opportunities to
cheat when completing a puzzle. The problem has been overcome by aggregating
165 Winter, ibid 344, 347.
166 Cowan and Hitchings (n 163).
167 Holstein and Gubrium (n 2).
168 JM Digman ‘Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model’ (1990) 41 Ann Rev Psychol 417;
ER Thompson and GP Prendergast, ‘The Inﬂuence of Trait Affect and the Five-factor Personality Model
on Impulse Buying’ (2015) 76 Pers Individ Dif 216.
169 H Hartshorne and M May, Studies in the Nature of Character, Vol I : Studies in Deceit (Macmillan 1929);
The studies measured a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.23 (0.1 is near meaningless and 0.9 is strongly corre-
lated). Also see: W Mischel, Personality and Assessment (John Wiley and Sons 1968). Further similar studies
by Mischel of various populations rarely produced correlation coefﬁcients of above 0.3, suggesting accurate
prediction of responses of particular people to particular situations is unlikely.
170 ibid.
Character, Autonomy, and Best Interests in Minimally Conscious State • 25
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwx051/4621373
by University of Bristol Library user
on 27 March 2018
behaviours over sustained periods171 in order to produce a ‘dominant’ tendency. Yet
this method is both controversial172 (since contrary traits that are in the minority are
ignored) and at best concedes that character can be measured only in general terms.
These seminal experiments looked at the behaviours of children, who might be ex-
pected to display more erratic behaviours than adults. Moreover, the MCA 2005 seeks
to guide decision-making in extremely difﬁcult circumstances. Even accepting that de-
viation from normal behaviours occurs, dominant characteristics may be argued to be
accurate enough for the situations in which best interests must be determined.
However, it is these very situational factors which give rise to a second indication that
character may be of poor predictive value, and this can be observed whatever the age
of the person in question.
Psychologists of the ‘situationist’ school argue that character is a far weaker driver
of behaviour than circumstantial factors. They point to a large number of behavioural
experiments where people act in ways that seem directly inﬂuenced by situational
cues. In one experiment, users of a public telephone were given the opportunity to
help an experimental confederate who dropped a sheaf of papers. Helping behaviour
strongly correlated with whether the test subject had unexpectedly found a dime in
the telephone box directly before the encounter.173 Another experiment measured the
helping behaviour of seminary students. On their way to deliver a sermon, the stu-
dents had a confected encounter with an experimental confederate who was slumped
in a doorway in a feigned state of distress. Helping behaviours correlated with whether
the students had been told prior to setting out that they were running late or early.174
Internationally, a huge number of studies have reproduced Milgram’s ethically contro-
versial experiments on obedience.175 These measure the compliance of test subjects
in delivering (faked) electric shocks to an experimental confederate on the orders of a
white coated ‘scientist.’ The results of these experiments were remarkably uniform
across cultures, ages and genders. They indicated in almost every instance that two-
thirds of test subjects, despite marked personal duress, were fully obedient to the sci-
entist’s polite but ﬁrm instructions, even when they received cues that the confederate
had been (perhaps fatally) injured by the voltage.176 Situationists have argued that,
even if enduring character traits exist, these experiments indicate that even small
changes in situational factors can radically inﬂuence behaviour.177 It may be objected
that many of these experiments took place many decades ago, before the negative im-
pact of research involving deception and duress upon the participants was widely ac-
knowledged. Nevertheless the abundance of such experiments and the consistency of
171 Correlation coefﬁcients of 0.86 have been measured this way. See: S Epstein and EJ O’Brien, ‘The Personal
and Situation Debate in Historical and Current Perspective’ (1985) 98 Psychol Bull 513.
172 Doris (n 3) 72–85.
173 AM Isen and PF Levin, ‘Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness’ (1972) 21 J Pers Soc
Psychol 384.
174 JM Darley and CD Batson, ‘“From Jerusalem to Jericho": A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables
in Helping Behaviour’ (1973) 27 J Pers Soc Psychol 100.
175 S Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Harper and Row 1974).
176 Doris (n 3) 39–51.
177 ibid.
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the results they produced suggests we should give these ﬁndings credence, despite
their age and ethical deﬁciencies.
Evidence from experimental psychology raises questions about the consistency of
dispositions and suggests that consistent dispositions do not result in consistent be-
haviour. It also indicates the important role of situations in determining behaviour. By
doing so, it damages the ‘common-sense’ approach to character as an enduring, pre-
dictable, and dominant feature in decision-making, on which the law apparently relies.
In particular, character and disposition seem unreliable if we try to predict speciﬁc be-
haviours in speciﬁc situations. Yet this is exactly what the courts are wont to do in the
cases described.
VI . CONCLUSION
Our preliminary investigation into the interaction between bioethics and medical law
used a thematic approach to analysing judgments of the best interests of patients in
MCS. A number of themes arose from the analysis, including (in many cases) the fre-
quent use of narratives about the character of patients.
I have analysed some of these cases above. In W v M,178 the present and past char-
acter of the patient was contended. In successive instances of James,179 differing em-
phasis was placed on the determined and family-orientated character of the patient or
on their extreme fragility. In Lincolnshire v N,180 character was used to bulwark an in-
terpretation of a patient’s actions. In M v N,181 a sustained discussion of character was
undertaken. In all but one of these cases (W v M), character was used to furnish an
autonomy-facing narrative. Also noted, but not explored, were the frequent characteri-
sations of the family and other witnesses in these judgments. At a basic level, the use
of character might be explained in the latter by the need to determine a witness’ credi-
bility. In the case of patients themselves, it speaks of the requirements of the MCA
2005, section 4(6) to determine the values, beliefs, wishes, and feelings of the patient.
How better to do this than to investigate character? Indeed, anecdotally, clinicians
aver this is as a common approach in best interests meetings in the clinic. At a deeper
level this may indicate the direction of travel of wider health law. The recent advent of
the ‘particular patient standard’ in the law of consent182 could conceivably mean that
doctors must engage with their patients’ fundamental personal motivations. Such an
approach may involve an exploration of patient character and narrative.
The use of character to focus exclusively on expressions of autonomy accords with
a perfectionist theory of well-being. Perfectionist approaches populate an ‘objective
list’ of goods according to the human capabilities that are needed to live (and die) vir-
tuously. In this reading of the law, the MCA 2005 at section 4(6) declares the capabil-
ity of autonomy to be essential to having a good life and death. The character of
patients is used to furnish decisions within this category of autonomy, with the judge
supplying the agential means for the patient to express their character according to
178 W v M (n 14).
179 James (n 15); NHS v DJ (n 78); NHS v James (n 78).
180 Lincolnshire v N (n 38).
181 M v N (n 38).
182 Montgomery v Lanarkshire (n 150).
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their own ends. While this approach appears sympathetic to the pro-autonomy incli-
nation of the MCA, it raises signiﬁcant concerns about the consistency and compre-
hensiveness of an understanding of human nature that accords autonomy such a
dominant role. Given the potential for autonomy to be used to express both Kantian
rationality and Millian liberty, it may lead to inconsistent judgments. Moreover, while
autonomy may be used to express a patient’s wishes about the weight they want the
opinions of their loved ones or doctors to have in deciding their treatment, it seems a
poorly adapted vehicle for this task, and suggests too little attention is paid to rela-
tional or care-based accounts of healthcare decision-making. The identiﬁcation of a
perfectionist approach also indicates that questions need to be asked about the under-
standing of character on which these judgments are based. Adversarial law requires
clear narratives that discredit contradictory reports. This makes the court a poor arena
for a full and expansive exploration of the patient’s character. It has long been recog-
nised that a person can have many, sometimes contradictory, facets—indeed some of
these may never be shared with others. Insights from experimental psychology further
undermine the worth of evaluations of character, for moral (and other) traits are in-
consistently exhibited and easily inﬂuenced by situational factors. These insights chal-
lenge the folk-wisdom account of character upon which the law apparently rests.
What, then are we to do when faced with patients whose severity of illness is so
great that we doubt it should be borne? Ultimately, the range of concerns I have raised
suggests the patients in these cases are simply beyond the limits of autonomy. Indeed,
even when aware of approaching death, I have suggested that some people may favour
other approaches, such as putting their trust in families or clinicians to do the right
thing.
Despite these reservations, we may nevertheless still wish to make some determi-
nation of what a person may have wanted. Making decisions on behalf of others is
morally burdensome. It may be more than a family, clinician, or judge can bear to
make an extremely weighty decision without some sense it would be agreed to by the
patient. In these cases we must recognise both the limitations of an adversarial ap-
proach and the inconsistency of character. Better techniques may exist, and an engage-
ment with, and research into, narratological approaches to ethics may be needed to
raise the calibre of current approaches to best interests decision-making.183 Above all,
we must recognise that, in part, we make these inquires for our own beneﬁt. This itself
speaks most loudly to approaches that favour relational and care ethics, and suggests
we must be wary of using justiﬁcations based on autonomy that have little grounding
in psychological understandings.
I recognise that a critique of character implicitly challenges many of the assump-
tions that underlie, not just the workings of law, but also society itself. Character eval-
uation is basic human currency. We marry, make friendships and workplace alliances,
feel socially supported or undermined, all on the basis of the predictable and enduring
nature of character. Yet in all of these instances, our behaviours result from a social
bargain in which we have some control and agency. With signiﬁcant reservations, we
can conclude that autonomy (sort of) works. Yet there are limits to autonomy. We de-
ceive ourselves if we do not admit it in these cases.
183 J Lothe and J Hawthorn, Narrative Ethics (Rodopi 2013).
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